Argument Relevance as the Right Kind of Epistemic Reason
Jonathan E. Adler
Abstract
Jonathan E. Adler
Abstract
A defense of the view that there is a central purpose in presenting an argument: to establish its conclusion, and so to secure belief in it. Relevance is then relevance to that purpose. To deem a statement relevant to an argument is to claim that it functions as a kind of epistemic reason pertaining to the cogency of an argument to establish its conclusion. Criticism of Walton's dialogue-relative understanding of relevance, as well as the probabilistic criterion of relevance or evidence.
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A defense of the view that there is a central purpose in presenting an argument: to establish its conclusion, and so to secure belief in it. Relevance is then relevance to that purpose. To deem a statement relevant to an argument is to claim that it functions as a kind of epistemic reason pertaining to the cogency of an argument to establish its conclusion. Criticism of Walton's dialogue-relative understanding of relevance, as well as the probabilistic criterion of relevance or evidence.
Key concepts: Relevance (law), Argument (complex analysis), Epistemology, Philosophy, Sociology, Law, Political science, Medicine