Academic Standards as Public Goods and Varieties of Free-Rider Behaviour

Economists have long recognized that goods allowing non-rival enjoyment accompanied by costly exclusion - pure public goods - present a challenge to efficient production because beneficiaries tend to understate their willingness to support such goods: such 'free-riders' realize that they cannot be denied access and may choose to enjoy without providing appropriate contribution. 'Academic standards' help identify the quality of academic performance (e.g., research, educated students), but the benefit they confer (e.g., reputation) strongly resembles a public good with its corresponding tendency to elicit free-riding and inefficiently low levels of production or support. This paper explores the manner in which such standards confer benefit, exhibit public good characteristics, and elicit free-riding and 'underproduction' in various parts of the academic community. It examines the resulting challenge to the maintenance of academic quality and the difficulty of discouraging free-rider behaviour.