2006•Journal of Public Economic TheoryRequires access

Compensations in Information Collecting Situations: A Cooperative Approach

S.H. Tijs, Judith Timmer, R. Brânzei

Open publisher page 5 citations

Abstract

Abstract This paper addresses the question of how to compensate people who provide relevant information to a decision maker who faces uncertainty. Several compensation rules for the decision maker are suggested and these are studied in a cooperative environment.

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What this paper is about

Abstract This paper addresses the question of how to compensate people who provide relevant information to a decision maker who faces uncertainty. Several compensation rules for the decision maker are suggested and these are studied in a cooperative environment.

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OpenAlex reports 5 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

Abstract This paper addresses the question of how to compensate people who provide relevant information to a decision maker who faces uncertainty. Several compensation rules for the decision maker are suggested and these are studied in a cooperative environment.

Key concepts: Decision maker, Compensation (psychology), Microeconomics, Economics, Cheap talk, Computer science, Management science, Psychology

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