2008•Unpublished venueOpen access

Analysis of Security Requirements for Cryptographic Voting Protocols (Extended Abstract)

Orhan Cetinkaya

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Abstract

Electronic voting refers to the use of computers or computerized voting equipment to cast ballots in an election and it is not an easy task due to the need of achieving electronic voting security requirements. The cryptographic voting protocols use advanced cryptography to make electronic voting secure and applicable. In this paper, formal definitions of security requirements for cryptographic voting protocols (privacy, eligibility, uniqueness, fairness, uncoercibility, receipt-freeness, accuracy, and individual verifiability) are provided, and elaborate checklists for each requirement are presented. The voting problem is clearly defined in terms of security requirements. The voting problem arises from the trade-off between receipt-freeness and individual verifiability. This paper suggests the Predefined Fake Vote (PreFote) scheme as an applicable solution to overcome the voting problem. The PreFote scheme is not a voting protocol; however, it is a building block that can be used by any voting protocol.

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What this paper is about

Electronic voting refers to the use of computers or computerized voting equipment to cast ballots in an election and it is not an easy task due to the need of achieving electronic voting security requirements. The cryptographic voting protocols use advanced cryptography to make electronic voting secure and applicable. In this paper, formal definitions of security requirements for cryptographic voting protocols (privacy, eligibility, uniqueness, fairness, uncoercibility, receipt-freeness, accuracy, and individual verifiability) are provided, and elaborate checklists for each requirement are presented. The voting problem is clearly defined in terms of security requirements. The voting problem arises from the trade-off between receipt-freeness and individual verifiability. This paper suggests the Predefined Fake Vote (PreFote) scheme as an applicable solution to overcome the voting problem. The PreFote scheme is not a voting protocol; however, it is a building block that can be used by any voting protocol.

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Available abstract

Electronic voting refers to the use of computers or computerized voting equipment to cast ballots in an election and it is not an easy task due to the need of achieving electronic voting security requirements. The cryptographic voting protocols use advanced cryptography to make electronic voting secure and applicable. In this paper, formal definitions of security requirements for cryptographic voting protocols (privacy, eligibility, uniqueness, fairness, uncoercibility, receipt-freeness, accuracy, and individual verifiability) are provided, and elaborate checklists for each requirement are presented. The voting problem is clearly defined in terms of security requirements. The voting problem arises from the trade-off between receipt-freeness and individual verifiability. This paper suggests the Predefined Fake Vote (PreFote) scheme as an applicable solution to overcome the voting problem. The PreFote scheme is not a voting protocol; however, it is a building block that can be used by any voting protocol.

Key concepts: Electronic voting, Voting, Computer science, Computer security, Cryptography, Cryptographic protocol, Protocol (science), Political science

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