2008•Mathematics of Operations ResearchRequires access

What Matchings Can Be Stable? The Testable Implications of Matching Theory

Federico Echenique

Abstract

This paper studies the falsifiability of two-sided matching theory when agents' preferences are unknown. A collection of matchings is rationalizable if there are preferences for the agents involved so that the matchings are stable. We show that there are nonrationalizable collections of matchings; hence, the theory is falsifiable. We also characterize the rationalizable collections of matchings, which leads to a test of matching theory in the spirit of revealed-preference tests of individual optimizing behavior.

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Key concepts: Falsifiability, Matching (statistics), Mathematics, Preference, Mathematical economics, Rationalizability, Combinatorics, Test (biology)