Piaget's Genetic Epistemology and the Problem of Truth

Piaget's work represents, f?om his own point of view, not only a study of intelligence, but a remedy for philosophical studies of the same subject matter. Philosophy in general, according to Piaget, “does not give us knowledge, as it lacks methods of verification”, that is, it does not give knowledge of anything except the personality of the philosopher “sim-ply meditating in his study by the light of his own reason”. Philosophical reflection can serve a heuristic function, but cannot yield objective knowledge, of truth. Piaget succinctly states this crucial methodologicalposition as follows: Although speculative reflection is a fertile and even necessary heuristic introduction to all inquiry, it can only lead to the elaboration of hypotheses, as sweeping as you like, to be sure, but as long as one does not seek verification by a group of facts established experimentally or by a deduction conforming to an exact algorithm (as in logic), the criterion of truth can only remain subjective, in the manner of an intuitive satisfaction, of “self-evidence,” etc.