2016•Unpublished venueRequires access
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
Robert J. Aumann, Adam M. Brandenburger
Open publisher page 643 citations
Abstract
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Robert J. Aumann, Adam M. Brandenburger
Abstract
An abstract is not available in the OpenAlex record for this paper.
OpenAlex reports 643 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
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Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Epsilon-equilibrium, Equilibrium selection, Game theory, Economics, Best response, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium