OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE IN ANNUAL REPORTS OF BANGLADESH
Md. Abdur Rouf, Abdullah-Al Harun
Abstract
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Md. Abdur Rouf, Abdullah-Al Harun
Abstract
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This study examines the association between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure levels in the 2007 annual report of 94 samples of Bangladeshi listed companies. Ownership structure is provided by management ownership and institutional ownership. Using agency theory, it is argued that firms with higher management ofownership structure may disclose less information and higher institutional of ownership structure may disclose more information to shareholders through voluntary disclosure. It is because the determined ownership structure provides firms lower incentives tovoluntarily disclose information to meet the needs of non-dispersed shareholders .Agency theory is utilized as the underlying theoretical framework of voluntary disclosure. Using a unweighted relative disclosure index for measuring voluntary disclosure. The extent of voluntary disclosure level is measured using 68 items recommended by those who have professional qualifications. The result shows that the extent of corporate voluntary disclosures is negatively associated with a higher management of ownership structure and the extent of corporate voluntary disclosures is positively associated with a higher institutional ownership structure.
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This study examines the association between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure levels in the 2007 annual report of 94 samples of Bangladeshi listed companies. Ownership structure is provided by management ownership and institutional ownership. Using agency theory, it is argued that firms with higher management ofownership structure may disclose less information and higher institutional of ownership structure may disclose more information to shareholders through voluntary disclosure. It is because the determined ownership structure provides firms lower incentives tovoluntarily disclose information to meet the needs of non-dispersed shareholders .Agency theory is utilized as the underlying theoretical framework of voluntary disclosure. Using a unweighted relative disclosure index for measuring voluntary disclosure. The extent of voluntary disclosure level is measured using 68 items recommended by those who have professional qualifications. The result shows that the extent of corporate voluntary disclosures is negatively associated with a higher management of ownership structure and the extent of corporate voluntary disclosures is positively associated with a higher institutional ownership structure.
Key concepts: Voluntary disclosure, Accounting, Turnover, Business, Agency (philosophy), Annual report, Principal–agent problem, Voluntary association