Learning in Games.
Jeff S. Shamma
Abstract
Jeff S. Shamma
Abstract
In a Nash equilibrium, each player selects a strategy that is optimal with respect to the strategies of other players. This definition does not mention the process by which players reach a Nash equilibrium. The topic of learning in games seeks to address this issue in that it explores how simplistic learning/adaptation rules can lead to Nash equilibrium. This article presents a selective sampling of learning rules and their long-run convergence properties, i.e., conditions under which player strategies converge or not to Nash equilibrium.
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In a Nash equilibrium, each player selects a strategy that is optimal with respect to the strategies of other players. This definition does not mention the process by which players reach a Nash equilibrium. The topic of learning in games seeks to address this issue in that it explores how simplistic learning/adaptation rules can lead to Nash equilibrium. This article presents a selective sampling of learning rules and their long-run convergence properties, i.e., conditions under which player strategies converge or not to Nash equilibrium.
Key concepts: Epsilon-equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Equilibrium selection, Best response, Sequential equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Correlated equilibrium, Risk dominance