1996European Journal of International RelationsRequires access

The European Economic and Monetary Union:

Dieter Wolf, Bernhard Zangl

Open publisher page 40 citations

Abstract

While most explanations of institutional change in the European Community concentrate either on the interests of governmental actors (intergovernmental institutionalism) or the interests of supranational and transnational actors (supranational institutionalism) the approach developed in this article tries to integrate the interests of governmental actors as well as domestic actors in one analytical framework. The article argues that both major decisions leading to the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union among the members of the European Community, i.e. the approval of the Delors Report and the approval of the results of the Intergovernmental Conference, can be explained in terms of this approach. In the conclusion, some indications are given that this approach might offer a more substantive explanation for the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union than both inter-governmental institutionalism and supranational institutionalism.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

While most explanations of institutional change in the European Community concentrate either on the interests of governmental actors (intergovernmental institutionalism) or the interests of supranational and transnational actors (supranational institutionalism) the approach developed in this article tries to integrate the interests of governmental actors as well as domestic actors in one analytical framework. The article argues that both major decisions leading to the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union among the members of the European Community, i.e. the approval of the Delors Report and the approval of the results of the Intergovernmental Conference, can be explained in terms of this approach. In the conclusion, some indications are given that this approach might offer a more substantive explanation for the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union than both inter-governmental institutionalism and supranational institutionalism.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 40 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

While most explanations of institutional change in the European Community concentrate either on the interests of governmental actors (intergovernmental institutionalism) or the interests of supranational and transnational actors (supranational institutionalism) the approach developed in this article tries to integrate the interests of governmental actors as well as domestic actors in one analytical framework. The article argues that both major decisions leading to the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union among the members of the European Community, i.e. the approval of the Delors Report and the approval of the results of the Intergovernmental Conference, can be explained in terms of this approach. In the conclusion, some indications are given that this approach might offer a more substantive explanation for the formation of the Economic and Monetary Union than both inter-governmental institutionalism and supranational institutionalism.

Key concepts: Institutionalism, New institutionalism, Historical institutionalism, European union, Political science, Economic and monetary union, Institutional economics, Political economy

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
The European Economic and Monetary Union: — Research Paper | ScholarLens