Estoppel: unconscionability as a cause of action

The current distinctions between different forms of estoppel are inappropriate and traditional orthodoxy is being challenged by judges and by academics. It is now necessary to recognise that the organising concept for the doctrine of estoppel is unconscionability because the function of estoppel is to restrain injustice arising from unconscionable conduct. The form ofestoppel, known as promissory estoppel, and stemming from the decision in Central London Property Ltd u High Trees House Ltd, is not triggered by the organising concept of unconscionability. It should be regarded, therefore, as an exceptional contractual response, in various situations, to the requirement of consideration. It follows that, in principle, estoppel based upon the concept of unconscionability, may be employed as an independent cause of action. There is ample evidence that this already happens in the context of claims concerning land. This article seeks to demonstrate that estoppel can and should be treated as an independent cause of action in a more general context.