Strategic and extensive games
Martin John Osborne
Abstract
Open-access reader
Martin John Osborne
Abstract
Open-access reader
Abstract The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is de-scribed. Strategic games, Bayesian games, extensive games with per-fect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, sub-game perfect equilibrium, and weak sequential equilibrium. 1.
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Abstract The basic theory of strategic and extensive games is de-scribed. Strategic games, Bayesian games, extensive games with per-fect information, and extensive games with imperfect information are defined and explained. Among the solution concepts discussed are Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, sub-game perfect equilibrium, and weak sequential equilibrium. 1.
Key concepts: Rationalizability, Equilibrium selection, Sequential equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Bayesian game, Nash equilibrium, Perfect information, Best response