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1994•Bulletin of Economic ResearchRequires access

EQUILIBRIA IN NON‐COOPERATIVE GAMES I: PERTURBATIONS BASED REFINEMENTS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM

Asha Sadanand, Venkatraman Sadanand

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Abstract

ABSTRACT The concept of Nash equilibrium is widely used to analyse non‐cooperative games. However, one of the problems with that concept is that many games have multiple equilibria. Recent work has concentrated on reducing or refining the set of Nash equilibria in some games. In this paper, we survey some equilibrium concepts based on perturbations of strategies that refine the set of Nash equilibria. We discuss the pros and cons of each concept and its relationship to the others by the use of numerous examples and intuition. It is hoped that this survey will enable the economist to consider the relevance of a particular equilibrium concept to a given economic model of interest. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

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ABSTRACT The concept of Nash equilibrium is widely used to analyse non‐cooperative games. However, one of the problems with that concept is that many games have multiple equilibria. Recent work has concentrated on reducing or refining the set of Nash equilibria in some games. In this paper, we survey some equilibrium concepts based on perturbations of strategies that refine the set of Nash equilibria. We discuss the pros and cons of each concept and its relationship to the others by the use of numerous examples and intuition. It is hoped that this survey will enable the economist to consider the relevance of a particular equilibrium concept to a given economic model of interest. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

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Available abstract

ABSTRACT The concept of Nash equilibrium is widely used to analyse non‐cooperative games. However, one of the problems with that concept is that many games have multiple equilibria. Recent work has concentrated on reducing or refining the set of Nash equilibria in some games. In this paper, we survey some equilibrium concepts based on perturbations of strategies that refine the set of Nash equilibria. We discuss the pros and cons of each concept and its relationship to the others by the use of numerous examples and intuition. It is hoped that this survey will enable the economist to consider the relevance of a particular equilibrium concept to a given economic model of interest. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Epsilon-equilibrium, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Economics, Equilibrium selection, Intuition, Symmetric equilibrium

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