Justice and the Bounds of Welfare

ABSTRACT The welfare state is but the vehicle for the provision of welfare and the latter does not necessarily entail the former. Much recent debate occasioned by government policy and rhetoric has therefore confused means and ends. This paper argues that a defence of welfare must come before a concern for protecting the welfare state. A number of foundations for guaranteed welfare provision, including justice, rights and contract are considered but the most persuasive foundation for welfare as need-meeting is found to lie in the Kantian categorical imperatives. Not only do these provide a moral prescription that welfare ought to be provided, they also dictate the ways in which it ought to be provided. It is against these requirements therefore that the necessity of a welfare state as a means of providing welfare can be tested. The second part of the paper then considers how extensive a welfare state needs to be, and how the boundaries between the public and private domains in the provision of welfare may be drawn. The equality principle, allied to the notion of equality of welfare, is found to be a useful instrument in determining the bounds of the public domain but only (so the paper concludes reluctantly) when harnessed to objective specifications of need.