Doa PosterioriPhysicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong?

Abstract A posterioriphysicalism is the combination of two appealing views: physicalism (i.e. the view that all facts are either physical or entailed by the physical), and conceptual dualism (i.e. the view that phenomenal truths are not entaileda prioriby physical truths). Recently, some philosophers such as Goff (2011), Levine (2007) and Nida‐Rümelin (2007), among others, have suggested thata posterioriphysicalism cannot explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal the nature of phenomenal properties. In this paper, I wish to defenda posterioriphysicalism from this new and interesting challenge, by arguing thata posterioriphysicalists have the resources to explain how phenomenal concepts can reveal at least something of what it would take for the corresponding phenomenal property to be instantiated.