2007Unpublished venueRequires access

Firm: A Team Economic Organization for Gaining Pareto Optimum Specific Public Goods

Cheng Cheng-ping, Yue Feng-li

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Abstract

The paper puts forward a new idea that firm is a team economic organization for gaining Pareto optimum specific public goods. Every production action needs both public goods and private goods. Specific public goods only can be produced by firm itself because government and social organization produce general public goods. If the production is linear non separability between privies, the output of public goods producing freely by privies is less than the Pareto optimum one. The idea is compatible to present theory, and can explain the basic theory phenomenon such as presence, line and scale of firm, etc.

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What this paper is about

The paper puts forward a new idea that firm is a team economic organization for gaining Pareto optimum specific public goods. Every production action needs both public goods and private goods. Specific public goods only can be produced by firm itself because government and social organization produce general public goods. If the production is linear non separability between privies, the output of public goods producing freely by privies is less than the Pareto optimum one. The idea is compatible to present theory, and can explain the basic theory phenomenon such as presence, line and scale of firm, etc.

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Available abstract

The paper puts forward a new idea that firm is a team economic organization for gaining Pareto optimum specific public goods. Every production action needs both public goods and private goods. Specific public goods only can be produced by firm itself because government and social organization produce general public goods. If the production is linear non separability between privies, the output of public goods producing freely by privies is less than the Pareto optimum one. The idea is compatible to present theory, and can explain the basic theory phenomenon such as presence, line and scale of firm, etc.

Key concepts: Public good, Pareto principle, Private good, Production (economics), Government (linguistics), Microeconomics, Economics, Industrial organization

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