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A Demand Commitment Model of Coalition Bargaining
Reinhard Selten
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Reinhard Selten
Abstract
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OpenAlex reports 22 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
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Key concepts: Unanimity, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Stochastic game, Economics, Outcome (game theory), Repeated game, Subgame