1995The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of MedicineRequires access

Individual Autonomy and the Double-Blind Controlled Experiment: The Case of Desperate Volunteers

B. P. Minogue, Gabriel Palmer‐Fernández, L. Udell, Bruce N. Waller

Open publisher page 37 citations

Abstract

This essay explores some concerns about the quality of informed consent in patients whose autonomy is diminished by fatal illness. It argues that patients with diminished autonomy cannot give free and voluntary consent, and that recruitment of such patients as subjects in human experimentation exploits their vulnerability in a morally objectionable way. Two options are given to overcome this objection: (i) recruit only those patients who desire to contribute to medical knowledge, rather than gain access to experimental treatment, or (ii) provide prospective subjects the choice to participate in standard double-blind study or receive the experimental treatment. Either option would guarantee that patients in desperate conditions are given a more meaningful choice and a richer freedom, and thus a higher quality of informed consent, than under standard randomized trials.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

This essay explores some concerns about the quality of informed consent in patients whose autonomy is diminished by fatal illness. It argues that patients with diminished autonomy cannot give free and voluntary consent, and that recruitment of such patients as subjects in human experimentation exploits their vulnerability in a morally objectionable way. Two options are given to overcome this objection: (i) recruit only those patients who desire to contribute to medical knowledge, rather than gain access to experimental treatment, or (ii) provide prospective subjects the choice to participate in standard double-blind study or receive the experimental treatment. Either option would guarantee that patients in desperate conditions are given a more meaningful choice and a richer freedom, and thus a higher quality of informed consent, than under standard randomized trials.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 37 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

This essay explores some concerns about the quality of informed consent in patients whose autonomy is diminished by fatal illness. It argues that patients with diminished autonomy cannot give free and voluntary consent, and that recruitment of such patients as subjects in human experimentation exploits their vulnerability in a morally objectionable way. Two options are given to overcome this objection: (i) recruit only those patients who desire to contribute to medical knowledge, rather than gain access to experimental treatment, or (ii) provide prospective subjects the choice to participate in standard double-blind study or receive the experimental treatment. Either option would guarantee that patients in desperate conditions are given a more meaningful choice and a richer freedom, and thus a higher quality of informed consent, than under standard randomized trials.

Key concepts: Autonomy, Informed consent, Vulnerability (computing), Personal autonomy, Quality (philosophy), Psychology, Randomized controlled trial, Social psychology

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Individual Autonomy and the Double-Blind Controlled Experiment: The Case of Desperate Volunteers — Research Paper | ScholarLens