Wildland Economics: Theory and Practice

Since passage of the Wilderness Act, economists have derived the total economic valuation framework for estimating wildland benefits. Over the same time period, policies adopted by public land management agencies have been slow to internalize economics into management decisions. The lack of spa- tial resolution and modeler bias associated with the FORPLAN model, combined with asymmetrical budget shortfalls, procedural errors and the overestimation of stumpage prices have contributed to a commodity bias in public land allocation decisions. This bias has spurred some economists to advocate privatization of public land management. Market forces cannot, however, be relied upon to adequately supply resources, and non-market alterna- tives are preferable for addressing the shortcomings identified. The 1964 Wilderness Act (Section 4b) recognizes the multiple benefits of areas: wilderness areas shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical uses. While the act provides a basic framework of wilder- ness uses, it does not begin to enumerate all of the uses and benefits of areas (Driver and others 1987; Reed 1989; Rolston 1986). Since passage of the Wilderness Act, economists have expanded and refined their methods for estimating the total economic benefits of wilderness. Unfor- tunately, public land managers have undervalued wildland resources resulting in a bias toward commodity production in both land and resource allocation decisions. The paper begins by examining economic research and how that research has been applied in practice on the public estate. Following a discussion of free markets, market fail- ure and the role of public lands in sustaining our wildland resources, the paper ends with nonmarket recommenda- tions for internalizing benefits into public land management.