2007Unpublished venueRequires access

Information Flow Control and Taint Analysis with Dependence Graphs

Jens Krinke

Open publisher page 9 citations

Abstract

• For critical system, formal approaches are needed. One is (static) information flow control which analyzes the software to check if it conforms to some security policy. An example is noninterference: secret information does not influence the publicly observable behavior of a system. • Many informal approaches can be subsumed under bug detection. A violation of some security policy can be regarded as a bug and therefore many bug detection approaches do some kind of taint analysis. Data from untrusted sources (e.g. the user) is tainted and is not allowed to reach exploitable functions like system calls vulnerable to buffer overruns.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

• For critical system, formal approaches are needed. One is (static) information flow control which analyzes the software to check if it conforms to some security policy. An example is noninterference: secret information does not influence the publicly observable behavior of a system. • Many informal approaches can be subsumed under bug detection. A violation of some security policy can be regarded as a bug and therefore many bug detection approaches do some kind of taint analysis. Data from untrusted sources (e.g. the user) is tainted and is not allowed to reach exploitable functions like system calls vulnerable to buffer overruns.

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OpenAlex reports 9 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

• For critical system, formal approaches are needed. One is (static) information flow control which analyzes the software to check if it conforms to some security policy. An example is noninterference: secret information does not influence the publicly observable behavior of a system. • Many informal approaches can be subsumed under bug detection. A violation of some security policy can be regarded as a bug and therefore many bug detection approaches do some kind of taint analysis. Data from untrusted sources (e.g. the user) is tainted and is not allowed to reach exploitable functions like system calls vulnerable to buffer overruns.

Key concepts: Taint checking, Computer science, Information flow, Computer security, Buffer overflow, Control flow, Control (management), Security policy

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