Ching‐to Albert
Abstract
This paper compares the cost and quality incentive effects of cost reimbursement and prospective payment systems in the health industru when providers are altuistic. Provider's behavioral rule is governed by a desire to maximize a weighted sum of profit and consumers' health benefit.
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This paper compares the cost and quality incentive effects of cost reimbursement and prospective payment systems in the health industru when providers are altuistic. Provider's behavioral rule is governed by a desire to maximize a weighted sum of profit and consumers' health benefit.
Key concepts: Reimbursement, Incentive, Payment, Prospective payment system, Business, Health care, Actuarial science, Quality (philosophy)