2008•Unpublished venueRequires access

On the Security of a Variation of Cramer-Shoup’s Public Key Scheme

Hung–Min Sun

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Abstract

In this paper, we show that a recently proposed variation of Cramer-Shoup’s public key scheme is insecure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Moreover, we showed that the proposed scheme doesn’t satisfy the non-malleability property, even under the weakest attack model ⎯ the chosen plaintext attack.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

In this paper, we show that a recently proposed variation of Cramer-Shoup’s public key scheme is insecure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Moreover, we showed that the proposed scheme doesn’t satisfy the non-malleability property, even under the weakest attack model ⎯ the chosen plaintext attack.

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Available abstract

In this paper, we show that a recently proposed variation of Cramer-Shoup’s public key scheme is insecure against the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. Moreover, we showed that the proposed scheme doesn’t satisfy the non-malleability property, even under the weakest attack model ⎯ the chosen plaintext attack.

Key concepts: Ciphertext, Malleability, Computer science, Semantic security, Key (lock), Scheme (mathematics), Ciphertext indistinguishability, Cryptosystem

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