2006•International Journal of Game TheoryOpen access

Sequential Formation of Coalitions Through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting

Inés Macho‐Stadler, David Pérez‐Castrillo, Nicolás Porteiro

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Key concepts: Cournot competition, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Outcome (game theory), Economics, Mathematical economics, Microeconomics, Constant (computer programming), Game theory

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Sequential Formation of Coalitions Through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting — Research Paper | ScholarLens