A systems perspective of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitoring and verification

On September 24, 1996, after decades of discussion and more than two years of intensive international negotiations, President Clinton, followed by representatives of (to date) more than 125 other countries, including the other four declared nuclear weapons states, signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Each signatory now faces a complex set of technical and political considerations regarding the advisability of joining the treaty. Those considerations vary from country to country, but for many countries one of the key issues is the extent to which the treaty can be verified. In the case of the US, it is anticipated that treaty verifiability will be an important issue in the US Senate Advice and Consent Hearings. This paper will address treaty verifiability, with an emphasis on the interplay between the various elements of the International monitoring regime, as prescribed in the CTBT Treaty Text and its associated Protocol. These elements, coupled with the National regimes, will serve as an integrated set of overlapping, interlocking measures to support treaty verification. Taken as a whole, they present a formidable challenge to potential testers who wish not to be caught.