Understanding developing country resistance to the Doha Round
Kevin P. Gallagher
Abstract
Kevin P. Gallagher
Abstract
The Doha Round negotiations at the World Trade Organization have come to a halt. The vast majority of analyses of the (at least temporary) demise of the Doha Round have focused on the lack of the United States and the European Union to reach consensus on the agricultural proposals that were tabled during the round. Relatively little attention has focused on explaining the rationale for why a large part of the developing world would not agree to proposals on the table as well. Many developing country negotiators claim that the potential benefits of the Doha Round were relatively small while the potential costs in terms of a loss of sovereignty to deploy effective development policies were significant. This paper argues that developing countries took a respite from the negotiations because the possible gains from market access were not large enough to trade for giving up domestic policy space for development policy.
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The Doha Round negotiations at the World Trade Organization have come to a halt. The vast majority of analyses of the (at least temporary) demise of the Doha Round have focused on the lack of the United States and the European Union to reach consensus on the agricultural proposals that were tabled during the round. Relatively little attention has focused on explaining the rationale for why a large part of the developing world would not agree to proposals on the table as well. Many developing country negotiators claim that the potential benefits of the Doha Round were relatively small while the potential costs in terms of a loss of sovereignty to deploy effective development policies were significant. This paper argues that developing countries took a respite from the negotiations because the possible gains from market access were not large enough to trade for giving up domestic policy space for development policy.
Key concepts: Demise, International trade, Developing country, Negotiation, Sovereignty, Market access, Multilateral trade negotiations, Respite care