Old Wine in New Bottles? The Theoretical Shift Towards Decisive Battle

This monograph analyzes classical warfare and modern warfare to determine whether there is a theoretical shift occurring that is blending the tenets of both of these theories of war. Exploitation of the inherent strengths of each of these theories of warfare could lead to a more cogent form of warfare appropriate for the U.S. Army as it implements its current transformation. The use of military force, or the threat of military force, has been a dominant feature of societies from the most primitive to the highly advanced. Whether organized along primitive tribal groupings for use only during time of war, or whether organized from complex industrial societies as professional standing armies, all military forces have theoretical underpinnings. Without a coherent theory of war, it is impossible to employ organized military force in an effective fashion. The military force operating from the most effective and appropriate military theory has the greater chance of victory. The two most dominant theories of war for conventional forces are those of classical warfare, enumerated by decisive battle, and modern warfare aptly defined within the operational art. The use of the concept of tenets is most useful as the monograph defines decisive and operational warfare. The monograph must first explore the definition of classical warfare and decisive battle. The monograph develops a definition for decisive battle utilizing historical example and then determines the tenets that propagate the theory of classical warfare. Analyzing in detail the component parts or tenets of the theory of classical warfare determines the theoretical basis for how the militaries of the past conducted warfare either successfully or unsuccessfully. Next, the monograph defines operational war, identifies its basic tenets and provides historical examples of the conduct of modern warfare. Like decisive battle, the concept of operational war is currently open to interpretation. However, there has been much work done on the subject of operational war by recent and current military theorists. Study and analysis of the theory of modern warfare and operational art will yield the answers of why the theory of war changed from classical warfare and if it in turn is susceptible to change. Analyzing in detail the component parts of modern warfare will also determine how the militaries of the recent past conducted warfare, either successfully or unsuccessfully. Defining classical warfare and modern warfare and determination of each theory's tenets in turn greatly assists in answering the main question the monograph poses. Is there a blending occurring between classical and modern warfare, which is an appropriate consideration for the U.S. Army? The monograph then defines and discusses the posited emergence of a theory combining decisive and operational warfare. The conclusion focuses on the implications for the Army Transformation and whether this theory is appropriate for the United States Army.