The Armored Cavalry Regiment in the 1990s: Time to Restore the Eyes and Ears of the Corps Commander
Mark D. Daniels
Abstract
Mark D. Daniels
Abstract
This paper addresses an apparent conflict between the doctrinal missions of the US Army's Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Its primary mission is to perform reconnaissance and security for the Corps commander. In practice, however, the ACR is more often employed in an economy-of-force role, tasked to attack or defend much like any tank or mechanized infantry brigade. Although the ACR is organized and equipped as a heavy, combined arms force, this only encourages the commander to wrongly commit his scouts to decisive battle. This concept that the cavalry should have to fight for information can only result in the loss of the commander's eyes and ears -- a potentially fatal mistake at any level of conflict. The author recommends strictly limiting the cavalry's mission to reconnaissance and security and, to enhance its currently poor scouting capability as well as preclude its continued misuse, organizing and equipping it as a light armored (wheeled) force optimized for mobility and stealth.
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This paper addresses an apparent conflict between the doctrinal missions of the US Army's Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR). Its primary mission is to perform reconnaissance and security for the Corps commander. In practice, however, the ACR is more often employed in an economy-of-force role, tasked to attack or defend much like any tank or mechanized infantry brigade. Although the ACR is organized and equipped as a heavy, combined arms force, this only encourages the commander to wrongly commit his scouts to decisive battle. This concept that the cavalry should have to fight for information can only result in the loss of the commander's eyes and ears -- a potentially fatal mistake at any level of conflict. The author recommends strictly limiting the cavalry's mission to reconnaissance and security and, to enhance its currently poor scouting capability as well as preclude its continued misuse, organizing and equipping it as a light armored (wheeled) force optimized for mobility and stealth.
Key concepts: Aeronautics, History, Engineering