The Way the Army Fights Today

Change 1 to Field Manual 3-0 We know how to fight today, and we are living the principles of in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, these principles are not yet institutionalized in our doctrine and in our training. They do not the force. Until they do, until they drive our leader development, our organizational design, and our materiel acquisitions we cannot consider ourselves ready, and we should not consider ourselves sufficiently adaptable. - General Martin E. Dempsey, Commanding Genera!, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. THE 2008 VERSION of Field Manual (FM) 3-0 initiated a comprehensive change in Army doctrine by capturing the Army's experience of over seven years of combat and using it to change the way the Army conceptualized operations. It established full spectrum operations - simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations - as the central concept of Army capabilities. Over the next two years the Army's full spectrum operations approach was validated in the crucible of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Change 1 to FM 3-0 builds on the tenets of this approach to increase the Army's operational adaptability by having the concept of (MC) replace battle as an activity and replace command and as a warfighting function. During nearly a decade of war, both the operational environment and how the Army operates in it have changed. This article highlights MC and other major changes in Change 1 to FM 3-0 to account for the changes in the operational environment and how we operate in it. This is the critical first step in institutionalizing these changes so they can pervade the force. Operational Environment and Hybrid Threats Combat experience and intelligence assessments often focus on hybrid threats that combine in a decentralized manner the characteristics of conventional and unconventional forces, terrorists, and criminals. Although the 2008 version of FM 3-0 did not discuss hybrid threats by that name, it included their characteristics, and these characteristics have now become the norm. To combat this threat, the Army is decentralizing its capabilities and conducting operations in a more distributed fashion. The operations take place in a complex and fluid environment and require leaders who not only accept but also seek adaptability and embrace it as an imperative. To enable leaders at all levels to succeed in this environment, the Army has determined that the term mission is a better description of how we must approach the art of and the science of control on the 21st century battlefield. Mission Command Mission emphasizes the importance of context and using disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to manage transitions among offensive, defensive, and stability operations and between centralized and decentralized operations. Mission emphasizes that the leader must understand, visualize, decide, direct, lead, and assess. In previous versions of FM 3-0, the term battle recognized the need to apply leadership to translate decisions into actions - by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose - to accomplish missions. However, the terms battle and command and do not adequately address the increasing need for the commander to frequently frame and reframe an environment of ill-structured problems. The terms battle and command and also do not adequately address the commander's role in team building with Joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners. However, suggests the critical role leaders at every echelon play in contributing to a shared understanding of the operational context. By emphasizing as an activity, Change 1 to FM 3-0 reinforces the central role of commanders, at all levels. …