Meta-Incommensurability between Theories of Meaning: Chemical Evidence
Nicholas W. Best
Abstract
Nicholas W. Best
Abstract
Attempting to compare scientific theories requires a philosophical model of meaning. Yet different scientific theories have at times—particularly in early chemistry—pre-supposed disparate theories of meaning. When two theories of meaning are incommensurable, we must say that the scientific theories that rely upon them are meta-incommensurable. Meta-incommensurability is a more profound sceptical threat to science since, unlike first-order incommensurability, it implies complete incomparability.
OpenAlex reports 3 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Attempting to compare scientific theories requires a philosophical model of meaning. Yet different scientific theories have at times—particularly in early chemistry—pre-supposed disparate theories of meaning. When two theories of meaning are incommensurable, we must say that the scientific theories that rely upon them are meta-incommensurable. Meta-incommensurability is a more profound sceptical threat to science since, unlike first-order incommensurability, it implies complete incomparability.
Key concepts: Meaning (existential), Epistemology, Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology