1983•Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systemsRequires access
Games in Normal Form
Eric van Damme
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Eric van Damme
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Key concepts: Nash equilibrium, Mathematical economics, Equilibrium selection, Epsilon-equilibrium, Robustness (evolution), Best response, Trembling hand perfect equilibrium, Sequential equilibrium