The Place of Kohlberg's Theory in Moral Education

A Skinnerian scenario is first sketched of our moral malaise and the contours of its cure. Moral objections to it are not elaborated. Rather it is used to introduce Kohlberg's objection to a ‘bag of virtues’ approach and his distinction between moral learning and moral development. Kohlberg's account of development is criticized on three main grounds: (i) he never shows that his stages form a logically hierarchical sequence; (ii) his account of ‘cognitive stimulation’, as the determinant of progression from stage to stage is too vague; (iii) he includes, and must include, concern for human welfare as a fundamental principle along with justice, but gives no account of the development of consideration for others, that is fundamental to morality. Indeed he shows a general neglect of the affective side of moral development. The work of Hoffman, Peevers and Secord is used to sketch how Kohlberg's account might be supplemented by a developmental account of concern for others. Mention is also made of the importance of giving an account of the more negative emotions of shame and guilt. The critique ends with logical and practical considerations which indicate the importance of the content of morality, which Kohlberg summarily dismisses by his contemptuous references to a ‘bag of virtues’. The overall purpose of the critique is to provide a constructive, if speculative, supplement to Kohlberg rather than to concentrate on negative criticisms.