1985Population and Development ReviewRequires access

Famines in Historical Perspective

Susan Watkins, Jane Menken

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Abstract

This paper presents a challenge to the Malthusian view that historically famines have been a consequence of overpopulation relative to available resources. The Malthusian paradigm has been used to explain periods of population stability in the past and to account for modern population growth once subsistence crises were no longer a threat. Using premodern Asian populations as a model the sequence of demographic changes that could be expected to have accompanied and followed famines in the past are simulated in this paper. Critical to an assessment of the demographic importance of famine is an understanding of the time it takes for a population to recover: the shorter the time to achieve prefamine population size the more frequent famines would have to be to serve as a check to population growth. The information used in this simulation of the consequences of famine includes the age composition of the population at the time the crisis began and the magnitude duration and age pattern of changes in fertility and mortality rates when the crisis was over. The simulation results suggest that the only way famines and other mortality crises could have been a major deterrent to longterm population growth is if they occurred with frequency and severity far exceeding that recorded in history. The simulations indicate that the low rate of natural increase set by normal levels of fertility and mortality constitutes a more plausible explanation for the longterm slow growth of large populations in the past. Moreover the control of normal mortality is most likely responsible for the onset of modern population growth. In general famines were sufficiently localized and brief that their demographic impact was modest and even relatively low rates of natural increase quickly erased their impact. Unless famine intensities increase greatly there is little likelihood that famines will be a major determinant of population growth in the future. Overall the social and economic effects of famines have probably been more farreaching than their demographic impact.

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What this paper is about

This paper presents a challenge to the Malthusian view that historically famines have been a consequence of overpopulation relative to available resources. The Malthusian paradigm has been used to explain periods of population stability in the past and to account for modern population growth once subsistence crises were no longer a threat. Using premodern Asian populations as a model the sequence of demographic changes that could be expected to have accompanied and followed famines in the past are simulated in this paper. Critical to an assessment of the demographic importance of famine is an understanding of the time it takes for a population to recover: the shorter the time to achieve prefamine population size the more frequent famines would have to be to serve as a check to population growth. The information used in this simulation of the consequences of famine includes the age composition of the population at the time the crisis began and the magnitude duration and age pattern of changes in fertility and mortality rates when the crisis was over. The simulation results suggest that the only way famines and other mortality crises could have been a major deterrent to longterm population growth is if they occurred with frequency and severity far exceeding that recorded in history. The simulations indicate that the low rate of natural increase set by normal levels of fertility and mortality constitutes a more plausible explanation for the longterm slow growth of large populations in the past. Moreover the control of normal mortality is most likely responsible for the onset of modern population growth. In general famines were sufficiently localized and brief that their demographic impact was modest and even relatively low rates of natural increase quickly erased their impact. Unless famine intensities increase greatly there is little likelihood that famines will be a major determinant of population growth in the future. Overall the social and economic effects of famines have probably been more farreaching than their demographic impact.

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Available abstract

This paper presents a challenge to the Malthusian view that historically famines have been a consequence of overpopulation relative to available resources. The Malthusian paradigm has been used to explain periods of population stability in the past and to account for modern population growth once subsistence crises were no longer a threat. Using premodern Asian populations as a model the sequence of demographic changes that could be expected to have accompanied and followed famines in the past are simulated in this paper. Critical to an assessment of the demographic importance of famine is an understanding of the time it takes for a population to recover: the shorter the time to achieve prefamine population size the more frequent famines would have to be to serve as a check to population growth. The information used in this simulation of the consequences of famine includes the age composition of the population at the time the crisis began and the magnitude duration and age pattern of changes in fertility and mortality rates when the crisis was over. The simulation results suggest that the only way famines and other mortality crises could have been a major deterrent to longterm population growth is if they occurred with frequency and severity far exceeding that recorded in history. The simulations indicate that the low rate of natural increase set by normal levels of fertility and mortality constitutes a more plausible explanation for the longterm slow growth of large populations in the past. Moreover the control of normal mortality is most likely responsible for the onset of modern population growth. In general famines were sufficiently localized and brief that their demographic impact was modest and even relatively low rates of natural increase quickly erased their impact. Unless famine intensities increase greatly there is little likelihood that famines will be a major determinant of population growth in the future. Overall the social and economic effects of famines have probably been more farreaching than their demographic impact.

Key concepts: Famine, Population growth, Population, Overpopulation, Subsistence agriculture, Fertility, Population control, Projections of population growth

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