IDOAKE: strongly secure ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol

Abstract ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol allows the sender Alice to generate a session key without interacting with receiver Bob. As a result, it is better suitable for some application scenarios than the two‐pass counterpart. However, currently there are few ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocols with a security proof in a formal model. The paper investigates the ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol in the enhanced Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) model. We propose a new ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange protocol IDOAKE, which is shown secure under Bilinear Diffie–Hellman (BDH) assumption in the eCK model. To the best of our knowledge, our protocol is the first provably secure ID‐based one‐pass authenticated key exchange in the eCK model. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.