The Ethics and Politics of Dwelling

Emmanuel Levinas argues that Heidegger's ontology, and the ethics it entails, fall short because while Dasein relates to the Other as being, Dasein fails to care for the Other as a “pure individual.” Heidegger's preoccupation with Being, Levinas thinks, diverts Heidegger's attention from the empirical, ethical claim made by the Other. On the political front, some argue that Heidegger's preoccupation with Being gives rise to political forces of nationalism and totalitarian politics. I argue that Heidegger's philosophy prepares the way for an alternative approach to ethics. Expressed in the way that Dasein comes-to-presence are the ontological relationships that reveal Dasein's ethical being-with-one-another. However, I contend that Heidegger's ontology becomes ethically complete when Derrida's notion of differance is added to the analysis. On my reading, Derrida's differance does not efface Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein, but rather differance furthers the ethical insight revealed in Dasein's disclosure through the process of presencing–absencing. Interpreting differance in light of Heidegger's understanding of presencing–absencing reveals the ethical significance in language, extends ethical responsibility to the Other, and deepens Heidegger's notion of dwelling. In addition, such a reading helps guard against the pernicious political possibilities some find in Heidegger's philosophy.