The Construction and Cumulation of Knowledge in International Relations: Introduction*

The idea of building knowledge—that humans can observe and think about the world in such a way that they learn things that they did not know before and are able to understand and explain processes—is at the center of all inquiry. This natural tendency has gone hand in hand with those who have questioned whether what we think we know is actually true and who have demanded that we defend the rules by which we believe knowledge is acquired. Despite this epistemological skepticism the quest goes on and on, even though those who want to display their sophistication may put key concepts, like “reality” or “cause” or “truth” in quotes or use intellectual euphemisms, like “utility” or “adequacy.” Today, within international relations (IR) inquiry, the debate over knowledge—its possibility, its nature, even its desirability—is informed by much of the postmodern and postpositivist movements within the social sciences and the humanities (see Foucault 1972, 1980; Vasquez 1995; Hellmann 2003). Constructivism has emerged as an alternative intellectual pillar of mainstream international relations theory to take its place alongside its competitors—realism and liberalism—to claim its role as a productive approach to inquiry. Although, like realism and liberalism, constructivism is better seen as a paradigm that encompasses a number of specific theoretical formulations, it nonetheless has a core set of assumptions and theoretical perspectives that shape its approach and provide guidance to its practitioners. Among the most central in terms of its epistemological assumptions is the idea that “reality” is constructed by concepts, ideas, and knowledge and not the other way around, namely, that the observation or study of “reality” gives rise to knowledge. Within constructivism this assumption is then used to push inquiry into new directions (see, for example, Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992; Katzenstein 1996; and earlier, Berger and Luckman 1966).