The Network Industry, Monopoly Regulation, and Social Optimum
Uriel Spiegel, Uri Ben‐Zion, Tchai Tavor, Joseph Templeman
Abstract
Uriel Spiegel, Uri Ben‐Zion, Tchai Tavor, Joseph Templeman
Abstract
This paper examines pricing policy, quality levels, consumer surplus and social welfare for the monopoly and non‐monopoly case. It is shown that given certain realistic assumptions, the network industry under unregulated monopoly would yield more social welfare than in the case of several producers in the industry, and would therefore be socially preferred.
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This paper examines pricing policy, quality levels, consumer surplus and social welfare for the monopoly and non‐monopoly case. It is shown that given certain realistic assumptions, the network industry under unregulated monopoly would yield more social welfare than in the case of several producers in the industry, and would therefore be socially preferred.
Key concepts: Monopoly, Economic surplus, Social Welfare, Economics, Microeconomics, Industrial organization, Welfare, Yield (engineering)