The Competition Criterion in British Merger Control Policy
Georgine M. Kryda
Abstract
Georgine M. Kryda
Abstract
The 1984 Tebbit Doctrine formalized competition as the watchword in British merger control, a highly discretionary system that encourages negotiation between firms and the government. The government has rarely invoked the full extent of its review powers over corporate mergers, even after the 1989 European Merger Control Regulation ceded some authority to Brussels. Is competition really a criterion influencing British merger control, or do institutional and personal biases direct the decision? This article reviews the rationale for merger control, outlines the structure of the British system, and analyzes merger activity and regulators' decisions from 1984–2000.
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The 1984 Tebbit Doctrine formalized competition as the watchword in British merger control, a highly discretionary system that encourages negotiation between firms and the government. The government has rarely invoked the full extent of its review powers over corporate mergers, even after the 1989 European Merger Control Regulation ceded some authority to Brussels. Is competition really a criterion influencing British merger control, or do institutional and personal biases direct the decision? This article reviews the rationale for merger control, outlines the structure of the British system, and analyzes merger activity and regulators' decisions from 1984–2000.
Key concepts: Merger control, Negotiation, Competition (biology), Competition policy, Control (management), Government (linguistics), Doctrine, Business