2014Unpublished venueRequires access

On-demand distributed on-card bytecode verification

Ahmed M. Mamdouh, Ayman M. Bahaa-Eldin, Mohamed Sobh

Open publisher page 1 citations

Abstract

After the evolution of Java-based smart cards, security issues arises concerning Java applets not to be vulnerable to modifications or malicious attacks that may threaten applications supported by these applets. Bytecode verification fills the latter gap. Java Sandbox Security model and Common Criteria standard suggest on-board bytecode verification to maximize security. This paper suggests an on-card bytecode verification whose execution is distributed within Java applet's lifecycle. Part of the verification runs on-demand at the run-time execution phase of the Java applets. The proposed solution targets a real Java-based card operating system.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

After the evolution of Java-based smart cards, security issues arises concerning Java applets not to be vulnerable to modifications or malicious attacks that may threaten applications supported by these applets. Bytecode verification fills the latter gap. Java Sandbox Security model and Common Criteria standard suggest on-board bytecode verification to maximize security. This paper suggests an on-card bytecode verification whose execution is distributed within Java applet's lifecycle. Part of the verification runs on-demand at the run-time execution phase of the Java applets. The proposed solution targets a real Java-based card operating system.

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OpenAlex reports 1 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

After the evolution of Java-based smart cards, security issues arises concerning Java applets not to be vulnerable to modifications or malicious attacks that may threaten applications supported by these applets. Bytecode verification fills the latter gap. Java Sandbox Security model and Common Criteria standard suggest on-board bytecode verification to maximize security. This paper suggests an on-card bytecode verification whose execution is distributed within Java applet's lifecycle. Part of the verification runs on-demand at the run-time execution phase of the Java applets. The proposed solution targets a real Java-based card operating system.

Key concepts: Bytecode, Java Card, Java applet, Computer science, Java bytecode, Java, Smart card, Smart card application protocol data unit

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