Reconsidering happiness: a eudaimonist's perspective

Kashdan, Biswas-Diener, and King (2008) provide a wide-ranging critique of eudaimonic theory and research. In this paper, I question whether the timing of their analysis is appropriate given that work on eudaimonic constructs has begun only recently. In an effort to increase the clarity regarding points at issue, both conceptual and operational definitions of hedonia and eudaimonia as two conceptions of happiness are analyzed along with definitions of four conceptions of well-being (subjective, hedonic, psychological, and eudaimonic), and both hedonism and eudaimonism as ethical philosophies. Responses are provided to numerous points in the Kashdan et al. (2008 Kashdan, TB, Biswas-Diener, R and King, LA. 2008. Reconsidering happiness: The costs of distinguishing between hedonics and eudaimonia. Journal of Positive Psychology, 3: 219–233. [Taylor & Francis Online] , [Google Scholar]) critique including their claims that work from a eudaimonic perspective (1) does not fully capture the philosophical roots of eudaimonia, (2) is overly abstract, (3) lacks clarity at the point of operationalization and measurement, (4) is overly complex thus preventing meaningful scientific inquiry, (5) provides evidence only for quantitative, not qualitative, differences, (6) is potentially elitist, and (7) misrepresents the moral standing of hedonia and eudaimonia. Evidence is presented in support of the view that hedonia and eudaimonia represent inter-related but reliably distinguishable and qualitatively distinct conceptions of happiness making independent contributions to an array of outcome variables. A set of recommendations is advanced as to how theory-building and empirical research can be strengthened in light of the multiple conceptualizations of happiness and well-being now current in the literature.