TESTING FOR PARAMETER STABILITY IN EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION FUNCTIONS
Andrew W. Braunstein
Abstract
Andrew W. Braunstein
Abstract
Executive compensation equations are estimated separately for three groups of firms, under the contention that the determinants of executive remuneration may depend upon the form of and degree of regulation in an industry. Empirical evidence obtained for three separate years lends support to that notion.
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Executive compensation equations are estimated separately for three groups of firms, under the contention that the determinants of executive remuneration may depend upon the form of and degree of regulation in an industry. Empirical evidence obtained for three separate years lends support to that notion.
Key concepts: Remuneration, Executive compensation, Compensation (psychology), Economics, Stability (learning theory), Empirical evidence, Econometrics, Accounting