RENT‐SEEKING FIRMS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY
Kyung Hwan Baik
Abstract
Kyung Hwan Baik
Abstract
Do consumers' consumer‐surplus (CS)–defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent‐seeking firm, consumers ' CS‐defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly, but given two or more rent‐seeking firms, such activities generally reduce the social costs. (JEL D72, L12)
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Do consumers' consumer‐surplus (CS)–defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent‐seeking firm, consumers ' CS‐defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly, but given two or more rent‐seeking firms, such activities generally reduce the social costs. (JEL D72, L12)
Key concepts: Monopoly, Rent-seeking, Economics, Social cost, Economic surplus, Microeconomics, Opportunity cost, Public economics