The Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria for International Duopoly with Multimarkets
Koji Okuguchi
Abstract
Koji Okuguchi
Abstract
The equilibrium prices for the Bertrand price and Cournot quantity models are compared for international duopoly with multimarkerts. It is shown that the equilibrium Bertrand prices are lower than the equilibrium Cournot prices if our global stability condition is satisfied for the equilibrium Bertrand prices, and if, in addition, a mild restriction is imposed on each firm's price responses to change in its rival's prices. [610]
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The equilibrium prices for the Bertrand price and Cournot quantity models are compared for international duopoly with multimarkerts. It is shown that the equilibrium Bertrand prices are lower than the equilibrium Cournot prices if our global stability condition is satisfied for the equilibrium Bertrand prices, and if, in addition, a mild restriction is imposed on each firm's price responses to change in its rival's prices. [610]
Key concepts: Cournot competition, Bertrand competition, Economics, Bertrand paradox (economics), Duopoly, Microeconomics, Mathematical economics, Oligopoly