1994•Games and Economic BehaviorRequires access

Strongly Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring and Discounting

Mark B. Cronshaw, David G. Luenberger

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Key concepts: Subgame perfect equilibrium, Discounting, Mathematical economics, Continuation, Subgame, Repeated game, Markov perfect equilibrium, Mathematics

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Strongly Symmetric Subgame Perfect Equilibria in Infinitely Repeated Games with Perfect Monitoring and Discounting — Research Paper | ScholarLens