Why Workers Want Unions
Henry S. Farber, Daniel H. Saks
Abstract
Henry S. Farber, Daniel H. Saks
Abstract
Why is it that some workers want unions to represent them and other workers do not? The question is basic to our understanding of union growth and behaviour. The answer must depend on what workers think unions can and will do for them and on how much particular workers value such union accomplishments. There are a number of potential points where a worker's preferences about unions could be observed: in a worker's decision to vote for having a union at the workplace; in the worker's decision to join an existing union in an open shop; in the worker's decision to take a job in a unionised firm; and in a worker's political behaviour toward the leadership and policies of his or her union. Unfortunately, the decision about the union is complicated by other potentially confounding decisions such as the undesirability of being a “free rider” in an open shop, the “tied sale” of taking a job and joining a union, and the array of interests which may determine the formation of political coalitions in unions.
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Why is it that some workers want unions to represent them and other workers do not? The question is basic to our understanding of union growth and behaviour. The answer must depend on what workers think unions can and will do for them and on how much particular workers value such union accomplishments. There are a number of potential points where a worker's preferences about unions could be observed: in a worker's decision to vote for having a union at the workplace; in the worker's decision to join an existing union in an open shop; in the worker's decision to take a job in a unionised firm; and in a worker's political behaviour toward the leadership and policies of his or her union. Unfortunately, the decision about the union is complicated by other potentially confounding decisions such as the undesirability of being a “free rider” in an open shop, the “tied sale” of taking a job and joining a union, and the array of interests which may determine the formation of political coalitions in unions.
Key concepts: Open shop, Politics, Labour economics, Labor union, Free rider problem, Value (mathematics), Industrial relations, Business