2011Unpublished venueRequires access

Technology spillover and cooperate R&D

SunXiaohua, ZhengHui

Open publisher page 0 citations

Abstract

Based on expanding AJ model, the three-stage cournot game model considering horizontal and vertical technology spillovers is built. From the equilibrium solution by reverse induction, the effects on firm R&D investment from horizontal and vertical spillovers are investigated under different cooperate R&D modes. It is found that except in the case of noncooperation, firms' R&D investment always increase with the rise of vertical spillover, and under horizontal and mixed cooperation, R&D investment increase with the rise of horizontal spillover. And then, the comparison of different cooperate R&D modes in terms of externalities shows that: when the level of technology spillovers is comparatively low, vertical cooperation can maximize R&D investment ; When the level of technology spillovers is comparatively high, mixed cooperation is the best choice for firm to increase R&D investment.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

Based on expanding AJ model, the three-stage cournot game model considering horizontal and vertical technology spillovers is built. From the equilibrium solution by reverse induction, the effects on firm R&D investment from horizontal and vertical spillovers are investigated under different cooperate R&D modes. It is found that except in the case of noncooperation, firms' R&D investment always increase with the rise of vertical spillover, and under horizontal and mixed cooperation, R&D investment increase with the rise of horizontal spillover. And then, the comparison of different cooperate R&D modes in terms of externalities shows that: when the level of technology spillovers is comparatively low, vertical cooperation can maximize R&D investment ; When the level of technology spillovers is comparatively high, mixed cooperation is the best choice for firm to increase R&D investment.

Why it matters

A significance statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Available abstract

Based on expanding AJ model, the three-stage cournot game model considering horizontal and vertical technology spillovers is built. From the equilibrium solution by reverse induction, the effects on firm R&D investment from horizontal and vertical spillovers are investigated under different cooperate R&D modes. It is found that except in the case of noncooperation, firms' R&D investment always increase with the rise of vertical spillover, and under horizontal and mixed cooperation, R&D investment increase with the rise of horizontal spillover. And then, the comparison of different cooperate R&D modes in terms of externalities shows that: when the level of technology spillovers is comparatively low, vertical cooperation can maximize R&D investment ; When the level of technology spillovers is comparatively high, mixed cooperation is the best choice for firm to increase R&D investment.

Key concepts: Spillover effect, Investment (military), Cournot competition, Externality, Horizontal and vertical, Microeconomics, Economics, Industrial organization

Related papers

Back to paper searchBrowse research topicsOriginal source
Technology spillover and cooperate R&D — Research Paper | ScholarLens