1997•Journal of Public EconomicsRequires access

Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs

Eric W. Wirths Bond, Keith J. Crocker

Open publisher page 127 citations

Abstract

This record does not include an abstract. Use the full-text link above if available.

About this research paper

What this paper is about

An abstract is not available in the OpenAlex record for this paper.

Why it matters

OpenAlex reports 127 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

Key contribution

A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.

Method / approach

Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Main findings

Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Limitations

Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Applications

Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.

Key concepts: Incentive, Private information retrieval, Microeconomics, Economics, Resource (disambiguation), State (computer science), Actuarial science, Business

Back to paper search Browse research topics Original source

Hardball and the soft touch: The economics of optimal insurance contracts with costly state verification and endogenous monitoring costs — Research Paper | ScholarLens