Who Should Vote? Conceptualizing Universal Suffrage in Studies of Democracy

This article offers a critique and reconceptualization of the notion of universal suffrage as it is used by scholars measuring the extension of democratic rights in the world today. Although the general perception seems to be that universal suffrage is almost universally recognized, it remains true that every political system upholds restrictions on the right to vote. In this article the various conceptual strategies employed in measuring the extension of the suffrage are analysed. Minimalist, conventionalist, and maximalist definitions of universal suffrage are distinguished and evaluated with respect to the criteria of concept formation. The argument advanced is that much confusion is caused by the failure to keep distinct the descriptive and normative components. Rather than defining democratic universal suffrage as consistent with a vast array of exclusions, the article argues that measuring the extension of the vote should be more carefully distinguished from arguments about how inclusive the suffrage ought to be. Only then could we estimate the inclusiveness of democratic systems empirically without invoking potentially controversial views about how the right vote should eventually be distributed.