The development of causal reasoning
Deanna Kuhn
Abstract
Deanna Kuhn
Abstract
How do inference rules for causal learning themselves change developmentally? A model of the development of causal reasoning must address this question, as well as specify the inference rules. Here, the evidence for developmental changes in processes of causal reasoning is reviewed, with the distinction made between diagnostic causal inference and causal prediction. Also addressed is the paradox of a causal reasoning literature that highlights the competencies of young children and the proneness to error among adults. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:327-335. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1160 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
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How do inference rules for causal learning themselves change developmentally? A model of the development of causal reasoning must address this question, as well as specify the inference rules. Here, the evidence for developmental changes in processes of causal reasoning is reviewed, with the distinction made between diagnostic causal inference and causal prediction. Also addressed is the paradox of a causal reasoning literature that highlights the competencies of young children and the proneness to error among adults. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:327-335. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1160 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
Key concepts: Cognitive science, Epistemology, Computer science, Psychology, Philosophy