2012Oxford Review of Economic PolicyRequires access

Crisis-era protectionism and the multilateral governance of trade: an assessment

Simon J. Evenett, David Vines

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Abstract

This paper examines the multilateral governance of trade along with the prospects for its meaningful reform, in the light of recent, crisis-era discrimination against the many types of cross-border commerce. Prior episodes of protectionism provide a useful benchmark. The findings are not optimistic. The current set of multilateral rules is incomplete, has weak incentives for compliance, and can be readily circumvented. Only a far-reaching revision of these rules could induce more restraint.

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What this paper is about

This paper examines the multilateral governance of trade along with the prospects for its meaningful reform, in the light of recent, crisis-era discrimination against the many types of cross-border commerce. Prior episodes of protectionism provide a useful benchmark. The findings are not optimistic. The current set of multilateral rules is incomplete, has weak incentives for compliance, and can be readily circumvented. Only a far-reaching revision of these rules could induce more restraint.

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OpenAlex reports 16 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

This paper examines the multilateral governance of trade along with the prospects for its meaningful reform, in the light of recent, crisis-era discrimination against the many types of cross-border commerce. Prior episodes of protectionism provide a useful benchmark. The findings are not optimistic. The current set of multilateral rules is incomplete, has weak incentives for compliance, and can be readily circumvented. Only a far-reaching revision of these rules could induce more restraint.

Key concepts: Protectionism, Economics, Incentive, Corporate governance, International economics, International trade, Benchmark (surveying), Global governance

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