Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance
Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw
Abstract
Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw
Abstract
Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw, Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 315-328
OpenAlex reports 78 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.
A contribution statement is not available in the OpenAlex record.
Method details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Findings are not separately available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Limitations are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Application details are not available in the OpenAlex metadata.
Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw, Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 315-328
Key concepts: Incentive, Business, Value (mathematics), Enterprise value, Actuarial science, Finance, Microeconomics, Economics