1987Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisRequires access

Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance

Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw

Open publisher page 78 citations

Abstract

Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw, Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 315-328

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Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw, Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 315-328

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OpenAlex reports 78 citations for this work. Citation counts describe recorded attention and do not establish research quality.

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Available abstract

Tim S. Campbell, William A. Kracaw, Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 315-328

Key concepts: Incentive, Business, Value (mathematics), Enterprise value, Actuarial science, Finance, Microeconomics, Economics

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